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I INTRODUCTION
The separate legal personality of a company is the very foundation on
which company law rests. The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (‘the Compa-
nies Act’) has introduced into South African company law, for the ﬁrst
time, a statutory provision permitting inroads to be made into this
fundamental principle. Section 20(9) of the Companies Act permits a
court to disregard the separate legal personality of a company and to
pierce the corporate veil in instances of ‘an unconscionable abuse of the
juristic personality of the company as a separate entity’.
While this provision is to be welcomed, it does raise many questions
and uncertainties. For instance, the section fails to deﬁne the term
‘unconscionable abuse’ and to provide any guidance on the circum-
stances that constitute an ‘unconscionable abuse’ of the juristic person-
ality of the company as a separate entity. It is also not clear from a
reading of the section whether section 20(9) overrides the common law
or the judicial instances of piercing the corporate veil, or whether
piercing of the veil must still be regarded as an exceptional remedy to be
used only as a last resort, as is the case at common law.Moreover, section
20(9) does not provide guidance in regard to who would constitute an
‘interested person’ within the scope and ambit of the section.
In the recent case of Ex parte Gore and Others NNO1 (‘Gore’) the
Western Cape High Court, per Binns-Ward J, delivered the ﬁrst
judgment on section 20(9) of the Companies Act. The case dealt with the
issue of piercing the corporate veil in the context of company groups.
The court applied section 20(9) of the Companies Act to the facts before
it and resolved to pierce the corporate veil. In the course of its judgment,
the court answered some of the questions set out above, and usefully set
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out some important guidelines in regard to the interpretation and
application of section 20(9) of the Companies Act.
The ﬁrst part of this article will examine some of the guidelines
provided by Gore for the interpretation of section 20(9) of the Compa-
nies Act. It will be argued that the wording and the interpretation of
section 20(9) of the Companies Act as decided in Gore result in giving
courts very wide powers to pierce the corporate veil, which hitherto
never existed under the common-law remedy of piercing the corporate
veil. Even though some of the questions and uncertainties regarding the
interpretation of section 20(9) of the Companies Act may have been
addressed in Gore, what remains unclear is the general effect of the
exercise of this power on the remedy of piercing the corporate veil in
South African law.
The second part of this article will argue that, in the light of the
extensive powers given to courts to pierce the corporate veil under
section 20(9) of the Companies Act, in applying the section it is of
fundamental importance that courts do not disregard the separate legal
personality of a company too easily, and that they ensure that the correct
balance is struck between piercing the corporate veil and upholding the
overarching principle of the separate legal personality of a company
enshrined in section 19(1) of the Companies Act. As stated above, courts
must exercise caution and wisdom to ensure that they do not develop a
disproportionate and inappropriate application of the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil in South African law.
Finally, the third and ﬁnal part of this article will contend that courts
must interpret and apply section 20(9) of the Companies Act in a way
that results in clarity and simplicity in the statutory doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil. Two ways in which this may be done are suggested
in the third part of the article.
As the court in Gore emphasised, the Companies Act enjoins that its
provisions be construed with appropriate regard to section 5(2) of the
Companies Act, which provides that, to the extent appropriate, a court
interpreting or applying the Companies Act may consider foreign law.2
Accordingly, where relevant, this article will refer to recent trends in
foreign law in regard to the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil that
may serve as guidelines to the interpretation and the application of the
doctrine in South African law.
2 Idem para 32.
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II INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 20(9) OF THE
COMPANIES ACT
Section 20(9) of the Companies Act states:
‘If, on application by an interested person or in any proceedings in
which a company is involved, a court ﬁnds that the incorporation of
the company, any use of the company, or any act by or on behalf
of the company, constitutes an unconscionable abuse of the juristic
personality of the company as a separate entity, the court may–
(a) declare that the company is to be deemed not to be a juristic
person in respect of any right, obligation or liability of the
company or of a shareholder of the company or, in the case of a
non-proﬁt company, a member of the company, or of another
person speciﬁed in the declaration; and
(b) make any further order the court considers appropriate to give
effect to a declaration contemplated in paragraph (a).’3
The language of section 20(9) has undoubtedly been cast in very wide
terms, which, as Gore remarked, indicate an appreciation by the
legislature that the provision would apply in widely varying factual
circumstances.4 Some elements of section 20(9) that illustrate the
breadth of the provision are discussed below.
(a) Invoking section 20(9) of the Companies Act
Section 20(9) of the Companies Act may be invoked by means of an
application by an interested person (discussed further below). The
words ‘or in any proceedings in which a company is involved’ in section
20(9) make it clear that a court may of its own initiative (mero motu)
pierce the corporate veil. This interpretation of section 20(9) was
conﬁrmed in Gore’s case.5 A court may thus disregard the separate legal
personality of a company even where the applicant or plaintiff in the
matter before it has not requested the court to do so. This already
3 Confusionmay arise as to the reasonwhy the heading of s 163 of the Companies Act reads
as follows: ‘Relief from oppressive or prejudicial conduct or from abuse of separate juristic
personality of company.’ The reason is that before the Companies Amendment Act 3 of 2011
came into force, the section on abuse of separate juristic personality was located in s 163 of the
Companies Act.When the provision wasmoved by the Companies Amendment Act 3 of 2011
to s 20 of theCompanies Act, the legislature inadvertently failed to amend the heading of s 163
of the Companies Act to remove the incorrect reference to the abuse of the separate juristic
personality of a company.
4 Supra note 1 para 32.
5 Idem para 35.
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illustrates the width of the powers given to the courts under section
20(9) of the Companies Act to pierce the corporate veil.
(b) Instances in which section 20(9) may be applied
Under section 20(9) of the Companies Act, the corporate veil will be
pierced where a court ﬁnds that there was an unconscionable abuse of
the juristic personality of the company as a separate entity. In order for
section 20(9) of the Companies Act to apply, unconscionable abuse of
the juristic personality of a company must occur in any one of three
instances: (i) on the incorporation of the company; (ii) as a result of any
use of the company as a legal entity; or (iii) as a result of any act by, or on
behalf of, the company.
It is clear from the wording of section 20(9) that the provision may be
invoked not only where the incorporation of a company constitutes an
unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality of the company as a
separate entity, but also where a company has initially been legitimately
established but is thereafter misused. This position accords with the
position at common law. In Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling
Investments (Pty) Ltd,6 the then Appellate Division stated that under the
common law, the corporate personality of a company may be disre-
garded even if the company had been legitimately established and
operated but was subsequently misused in a particular instance to
perpetrate a fraud, or for a dishonest or improper purpose, and that it is
not necessary for the company to have been ‘conceived and founded in
deceit’7 before its corporate personality may be disregarded. In the
English case of Faiza Ben Hashem v Ali Shayif,8 Munby J also remarked
that a company may be a façade even though it was not originally
incorporated with any deceptive intent — the question is whether it is
being used as a façade at the time of the relevant transaction.9
Theword ‘may’ in section 20(9) indicates that courts have a discretion
whether to pierce the corporate veil. Thus, even if the requirements of
section 20(9) are fulﬁlled, a court is not obliged to pierce the corporate
veil, but has a discretion whether to do so.
(c) Orders which may be made by a court under section 20(9) of
the Companies Act
If a court ﬁnds that there was an unconscionable abuse of the juristic
personality of the company as a separate entity, it may declare a
6 1995 (4) SA 790 (A).
7 Idem at 804.
8 [2008] EWHC 2380 (Fam).
9 Idem para 164.
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company not to be a juristic person in respect of any rights, obligations
or liabilities of the company, or of a shareholder of the company, or, in
the case of a non-proﬁt company, a member of the company or of
another person speciﬁed in the declaration. A court does not have the
power to intervene under section 20(9) of the Companies Act where
the unconscionable abuse is not in respect of any such right, obligation
or liability. In declaring that a company is deemed not to be a juristic
person, a court is given a wide discretion by section 20(9)(b) of the
Companies Act to make any further orders that it considers appropriate
to give effect to such declaration. The court in Gore pointed out that an
order made in terms of section 20(9)(b) will always have the effect of
ﬁxing the right, obligation or liability of the company somewhere else.10
This again illustrates the extensive powers conferred by section 20(9)
on the courts. As the court in Gore commented, section 20(9)(b) gives
the courts ‘the very widest of powers to grant consequential relief’.11
(d) ‘Interested person’ under section 20(9) of the Companies Act
The application to declare that the company be deemed not to be a
juristic person must be brought by an ‘interested person’. This term is
not deﬁned in section 20(9) of the Companies Act. In Gore the court
stated that no mystique should be attached to the term ‘interested
person’ and held:
‘The standing of any person to seek a remedy in terms of the
provision should be determined on the basis of well-established
principle; see Jacobs en ’n Ander v Waks en Andere 1992 (1) SA 521
(A), at 533J-534E, and, of course, if the facts happen to implicate a
right in the Bill of Rights, section 38 of the Constitution.’12
In Gore the controllers of various companies in a group had treated the
10 Supra note 1 para 34.
11 Ibid. See further F H I Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) 62–3.
12 Idempara 35. Section 38 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which
deals with the Enforcement of Rights, provides as follows:
‘Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court,
alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened,
and the courtmay grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights.
The persons who may approach a court are:
(a) anyone acting in their own interest;
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another personwho cannot act in their own
name;
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of
persons;
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members.’
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group of companies in a way that had failed to draw a proper distinction
between the separate personalities of the constituent members of the
group. The court found that the case fell within the ambit of section
20(9) of the Companies Act, and ruled that the impropriety of the
controllers of the group had constituted an unconscionable abuse of
the juristic personalities of the subsidiary companies as separate entities.
As to the question whether the applicants, who were the liquidators of
the various companies that had formed part of the group of companies,
were ‘interested persons’ under section 20(9) of the Companies Act, the
court had no hesitation in ﬁnding that the liquidators of the companies
had a direct and sufﬁcient interest in the relief sought so as to qualify as
‘interested persons’ under section 20(9) of the Companies Act.13
A person who claims relief from a court in respect of any matter must
as a general rule establish that he or she has a direct interest in that
matter in order to acquire the necessary locus standi to seek relief.14 In
Jacobs v Waks15 the then Appellate Division stated that the direct interest
should not be remote, and that it must be a real interest and not an
abstract, academic or hypothetical interest.16
In a broad sense, ‘every individual has an interest in every suit that is
pending, for he may be placed to-morrow in the position of either
plaintiff or defendant in a case in which the same principle may be
involved’.17 However, as emphasised in Dalrymple v Colonial Trea-
surer,18 courts are not constituted for the discussion of academic
questions — they require the litigant to have not only an interest, but
also an interest that is not too remote.19 For instance, in Dalrymple v
Colonial Treasurer,20 the question before the court was whether taxpay-
ers had a sufﬁciently close interest in the matter to institute an action
where they contended that the executive government had breached a
statute (the Members of Parliament Act 12 of 1907) by spending public
funds contrary to the provisions of the statute. The applicants contended
that it was their right to see that public funds were not expended in
contravention of the Members of Parliament Act 1907. The court ruled
that a taxpayer who has paid his taxes does not have a right to be
13 Gore supra note 1 para 35.
14 Cabinet of the Transitional Government for the Territory of South West Africa v Eins 1988
(3) SA 369 (A) 388.
15 1992 (1) SA 521 (A).
16 Idem at 533–4.
17 Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer 1910 TS 372 at 390.
18 Supra note 17.
19 Idem at 390. See also Cabinet of the Transitional Government for the Territory of South
West Africa v Eins supra note 14 at 388.
20 Supra note 17.
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consulted in the disposition of those taxes, and if the collected taxes are
wrongfully dealt with by the Minister of the Crown, the individual
taxpayer’s interest in the taxes would be too remote to enable him to
summon the Minister before a court to defend his action.
In Jacobs v Waks,21 the court declared that the assessment of whether a
litigant’s interest in a case qualiﬁes as a direct interest, or whether it is too
remote, would always depend on the particular facts of each individual
case, and that no deﬁnite rule can be laid down.22
Applying this declaration to section 20(9) of the Companies Act, each
application before the court would necessitate the court’s examining
whether the interest of the applicant in deeming a company not to be a
juristic person is a direct interest that is not too remote, abstract,
academic or hypothetical. The fact that no deﬁnite rule can be laid down
to answer this question means that courts must exercise their own
discretion on this issue on a case-by-case basis.
Section 65 of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 (‘the Close
Corporations Act’) permits a court to deem a close corporation not to be
a juristic person. Section 20(9) of the Companies Act is worded very
similarly to section 65 of the Close Corporations Act, which states as
follows:
‘Whenever a Court on application by an interested person, or in any
proceedings in which a corporation is involved, ﬁnds that the
incorporation of, or any act by or on behalf of, or any use of, that
corporation, constitutes a gross abuse of the juristic personality of
the corporation as a separate entity, the Court may declare that the
corporation is to be deemed not to be a juristic person in respect of
such rights, obligations or liabilities of the corporation, or of such
member or members thereof, or of such other person or persons, as
are speciﬁed in the declaration, and the Court may give such further
order or orders as it may deem ﬁt in order to give effect to such
declaration.’
In TJ Jonck BK h/a Bothaville Vleismark v Du Plessis NO,23 which
examined the meaning of the term ‘interested person’ in the context of
section 65 of the Close Corporations Act, the court remarked that the
term ‘interested person’ is not to be interpreted too restrictively, but at
the same time it is not to be interpreted too widely so as to include an
21 Supra note 15.
22 Idem at 534. See further Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer supra note 17 at 390 and Director
of Education, Transvaal v McCagie and Others 1918 AD 616 at 627.
23 1998 (1) SA 971 (O).
PIERCING THE VEIL UNDER SECTION 20(9) OF THE COMPANIES ACT 313
indirect interest.24 The interest must be material, relevant or direct, and,
in particular, it is limited to a ﬁnancial or monetary interest.25 The court
commented that a creditor of a close corporation, for instance, would be
an ‘interested person’ under section 65 of the Close Corporations Act.26
The question that arises is whether an applicant under section 20(9) of
the Companies Act would, in the light of the interpretation of ‘interested
person’ in the almost identically worded section 65 of the Close
Corporations Act, also have to demonstrate that his interest is of a
ﬁnancial or monetary nature.
In Gore the court did not explicitly deal with whether an ‘interested
person’ under section 20(9) of the Companies Act must have a ﬁnancial
or monetary interest, nor did the court refer to the interpretation given
to the term ‘interested person’ by TJ Jonck BK h/a Bothaville Vleismark v
Du Plessis NO.27 The court simply approved of and adopted the general
principles stated in Jacobs v Waks.28 In the latter case the Appellate
Division commented that it is not essential that the interest should be
measurable in monetary terms.29 Interestingly, and perhaps instruc-
tively, in Jacobs v Waks the court found that the second respondent in
that case had a direct interest in the setting aside of certain decisions by
the City Council on the ground that his dignitas had been infringed
by such decisions. It is arguable that, by implication, Gore did not
require that an ‘interested person’ under section 20(9) of the Companies
Act must have a ﬁnancial or monetary interest. This extends the scope of
section 20(9) of the Companies Act much more widely than that
of section 65 of the Close Corporations Act, where a ﬁnancial or
monetary interest is a requirement. It is debatable whether this is what
the court in Gore really intended.
On the one hand, it may be contended that owing to the very close
similarity in the wording of section 65 of the Close Corporations Act and
section 20(9) of the Companies Act, the narrow approach to the
interpretation of ‘interested person’ under section 65 of the Close
Corporations Act ought to be adopted to section 20(9) of the Companies
Act, and that a requirement of a ﬁnancial or monetary interest ought
also to be imposed under section 20(9) of the Companies Act. On the
other hand, it is arguable that the term ‘interested person’ must be
24 Idem at 986.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Supra note 23.
28 Supra note 15.
29 Ibid at 535. In Director of Education, Transvaal v McCagie supra note 22 the court also
held that the relevant interest need not be a ﬁnancial or monetary one (at 629).
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interpreted in the light of the legislature’s intention in the creation of the
Close Corporations Act.
Note that, as from 1 May 2011, which is the date when the Companies
Act came into force, new close corporations may no longer be formed
and companies may not be converted into close corporations. However,
existing close corporations may continue to exist indeﬁnitely and will
continue to be regulated by the Close Corporations Act.30 In TJ Jonck BK
h/a Bothaville Vleismark v Du Plessis NO31 it was stated that the objective
of establishing a close corporation as an alternative form of business was
to create a simpler and less expensive legal form for the single entrepre-
neur, having regard to the socioeconomic and political importance of
small businesses.32 In a close corporation, ownership and control are not
split, as is generally the case in a public company, and companies tend to
be larger and more complex than close corporations, and may even be
formed for non-proﬁt purposes. On this basis it may be contended that
these differences between companies and close corporations justify the
imposition of a ﬁnancial or monetary interest requirement in order to
qualify as an interested person in regard to close corporations, but not so
in regard to companies.
It is, however, to be noted that the Companies Act does now provide
for small owner-managed companies that are akin to close corporations
to be run in a simpliﬁed and ﬂexible manner. These provisions were
presumably inserted in the Companies Act in the light of the policy
decision taken not to permit new close corporations to be formed as
from 1 May 2011, nor to permit companies from being converted into
close corporations as from 1 May 2011, as discussed above. For example,
section 57(4) of the Companies Act simpliﬁes the holding of meetings
where every shareholder is also a director of the company, by permitting
a board meeting and a shareholders’ meeting to be rolled into one, and
conveniently dispenses with unnecessary compliance with internal
formalities in such a company.33 Another example would be section
57(2) of the Companies Act, which dispenses with the necessity of
internal formalities having to be complied with where a proﬁt company
has only one shareholder. Similarly, section 57(3) of the Companies Act
dispenses with compliance with internal formalities where a proﬁt
company has only one director. In addition, companies in which the
30 Refer to Schedule 3 item 2(1) of the Companies Act.
31 Supra note 23.
32 Idem at 986.
33 This is subject to certain requirements being fulﬁlled, as set out in s 57(4) of the
Companies Act.
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shareholders and directors are the same persons are exempt from having
their annual ﬁnancial statements audited or even independently
reviewed.34 The question thus arises: is it justiﬁable to apply a liberal
approach to the meaning of ‘interested person’ under section 20(9) of
the Companies Act in regard to small owner-managed companies that
are akin to close corporations, and that may be run in a less expensive
and simpliﬁedmanner, but to apply a stringent approach to themeaning
of ‘interested person’ in section 65 of the Close Corporations Act, where
a requirement of a ﬁnancial or monetary interest is imposed?
It is questionable whether it was the intention of Gore to extend the
scope of section 20(9) of the Companies Act much more widely than
that of section 65 of the Close Corporations Act, where a ﬁnancial or
monetary interest is a requirement. It is submitted that the meaning of
‘interested person’ under section 20(9) of the Companies Act ought to
be limited to a ﬁnancial interest. Until this discrepancy is clariﬁed by our
courts, it must be remembered that it was emphasised by the Appellate
Division in Jacobs v Waks35 that the assessment of whether a litigant’s
interest in a case qualiﬁes as a direct interest or whether it is too remote
would always depend on the particular facts of each individual case.
Thus a court may still, in its discretion, ﬁnd that on the facts of a
particular case before it under section 20(9) of the Companies Act, the
absence of a ﬁnancial or monetary interest by an ‘interested person’
would result in the interest being too remote, and that accordingly a
ﬁnancial or monetary interest would be required.
(e) Unconscionable abuse
The Companies Act does not deﬁne the term ‘unconscionable abuse’
and provides no guidance on the circumstances that would constitute an
unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality of the company. It has
been left entirely to the courts to determine the meaning and scope of
this term.
The term ‘unconscionable abuse’ is not to be confused with the term
‘onduldbare onreg’, which is translated as ‘unconscionable injustice’ in
Botha v Van Niekerk.36 In this case the court stated that it would pierce
the corporate veil if the plaintiff has suffered ‘unconscionable injustice’
34 See s 30(2A) of the Companies Act, which sets out some exceptions to the application of
this provision.
35 Supra note 15.
36 Botha v Van Niekerk en ’n Ander 1983 (3) SA 513 (W).
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as a result of improper conduct on the part of the defendant.37 It is
submitted that the court in Gore was correct in ﬁnding that the
difference between the terms ‘unconscionable abuse’ in section 20(9) of
the Companies Act and ‘unconscionable injustice’ is that ‘unconscio-
nable abuse’ relates to the conduct giving rise to the remedy of piercing
the corporate veil, whereas ‘unconscionable injustice’ relates to the
consequences of the conduct suffered by the plaintiff.38
In Gore the court had no hesitation in ﬁnding that there was an
unconscionable abuse of the juristic personalities of the companies in
the group as separate entities. The court found that the improprieties
had involved the controllers of the companies treating the group in a
way that had not drawn any proper distinction between the separate
personalities of the constituent members, and in using the investors’
funds in a manner inconsistent with what had been represented.39 For
instance, funds solicited from investors had been transferred by the
controllers of the holding company between the various companies in
the group at will, with no regard for the individual identity of the
companies concerned. In many instances the documentation purport-
ing to evidence an investment did not identify the company in which the
particular investment ostensibly was being made. The invested funds
were in fact allocated by the controllers of the group into whichever
company they saw ﬁt, which was generally the company in the group
that required immediate funds at the time. This occurred without any
properly kept accounting records. The court found that the ﬂow of
funds within the group appeared to have been materially determined
by the need of the controllers of the group to sustain their scheme by
ﬁnding money to pay out existing investors who wished to withdraw
their funds. Accordingly, the court declared that the companies in the
group, with the exception of the holding company, were deemed not to
be juristic persons in respect of any obligation by such companies to the
investors, and that these companies were to be regarded as a single entity
by ignoring their separate legal existence and treating the holding
company as though it were the only company.
In regard to the meaning of the term ‘unconscionable abuse of the
37 Idem at 525. InCape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd supra note 6 at
805, the Appellate Division commented that the test of unconscionable injustice laid down in
Botha v Van Niekerk supra note 36 for the purposes of determining when to pierce the
corporate veil is too narrow and rigid and a more ﬂexible test must be adopted, which would
allow the facts of each case ultimately to determine whether the piercing of the corporate veil
is called for.
38 Gore supra note 1 para 34n36.
39 Idem para 33.
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juristic personality of a company’ in section 20(9) of the Companies Act,
the court held that these words postulate conduct in relation to the
formation and use of companies that is diverse enough to cover all
the descriptive terms such as ‘sham’, ‘device’, ‘stratagem’, and ‘conceiv-
ably much more’.40 The court thus adopted a very wide interpretation of
the words ‘unconscionable abuse’.
Not only did Gore adopt a very wide interpretation of the words
‘unconscionable abuse’, but it also set a lower standard of abuse than that
required for the piercing of the veil of close corporations under section 65
of the Close Corporations Act. One difference between section 20(9) of
the Companies Act and section 65 of the Close Corporations Act is that
section 65 deems a close corporation not to be a juristic person in
instances of a ‘gross abuse’ of the juristic personality of the corporation as
a separate entity, whereas section 20(9) deems a company not to be a
juristic person where there is an ‘unconscionable abuse’ of the juristic
personality of the company as a separate entity. The court found that the
words ‘gross abuse’ in section 65 of the Close Corporations Act have a
‘more extreme connotation’41 than the words ‘unconscionable abuse’ in
section 20(9) of the Companies Act. Thus, in order for the corporate veil
of a company to be pierced under section 20(9) of the Companies Act, a
lower standard of abuse would need to be proved compared to the level of
abuse required for the corporate veil of a close corporation to be pierced
under section 65 of the Close Corporations Act.
It is questionable why the legislature chose not to use the words ‘gross
abuse’ in section 20(9) of the Companies Act, despite the section being
so similarly worded to section 65 of the Close Corporations Act in nearly
every other respect. It is also questionable why the court in Gore
postulated a lower standard of abuse for section 20(9) of the Companies
Act compared to section 65 of the Close Corporations Act, when in
general both companies and close corporations are statutorily formed
and registered for the purpose of, and beneﬁt of, limited liability. One
might argue that on Gore’s interpretation of the pivotal words ‘uncon-
scionable abuse’, just about any abuse of the juristic personality of a
company would be unconscionable. It is debatable whether too low
a level or threshold of abuse has been set by Gore, particularly in the light
40 Idem para 34.
41 Ibid. For a discussion of the meaning and examples of the term ‘gross abuse’, see Haygro
Catering BK v Van der Merwe en Andere 1996 (4) SA 1063 (C); TJ Jonck BK h/a Bothaville
Vleismark v Du Plessis NO supra note 23; Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim and Others
2008 (2) SA 303 (C); Cassim et al op cit note 11 at 60–2; and Rehana Cassim ‘Piercing the
corporate veil: Unconscionable abuse under the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ August 2012 De
Rebus 22 at 23–4.
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of the fact that, as previously discussed, the Companies Act now
provides for small owner-managed companies that are akin to close
corporations to be run more simply.
In Gore the court stated further that section 20(9) of the Companies
Act brings about a remedy that may be provided ‘whenever the
illegitimate use of the concept of juristic personality adversely affects a
third party in a way that reasonably should not be countenanced’.42 The
broad interpretation given to the term ‘unconscionable abuse’ by Gore,
together with the remedy of piercing the corporate veil being available
whenever the illegitimate use of the company’s separate legal personality
affects one in a way that should not reasonably be countenanced,make it
clear that the legal bases upon which courts have hitherto been prepared
to pierce the corporate veil under the common law have now been
considerably extended under section 20(9) of the Companies Act.43
By way of illustration, the question before the Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom in the recent case of VTB Capital plc v Nutritek
International Corp44 was whether, if a person used a puppet45 company
to enter into a contract with a third party in order to perpetrate a fraud
on that third party, the corporate veil may be pierced with the
consequence that the puppeteer would be treated as a party to
the contract. The Supreme Court refused to pierce the corporate veil in
this instance. The court held that to do so would amount to an extension
to the circumstances in which the corporate veil has been traditionally
pierced because it would lead to the person controlling the company
being held liable as if he had been a co-contracting party with the
company concerned to a contract to which the company and not he was
a party.46
However, Lord Neuberger, who wrote the unanimous judgment in
this case on the issue of piercing the corporate veil, observed that the
interposition of pertinent statutory provisions could determine a differ-
ent conclusion on the question of whether, and in which circumstances,
a court could pierce the corporate veil.47 In Gore, commenting on this
statement made by Lord Neuberger, the court remarked that section
42 Supra note 1 para 34.
43 See Gore idem para 33.
44 [2013] 2 AC 337.
45 Reference to the word ‘puppet’ means that the company is under a person’s control.
46 Supra note 44 para 132. The court of ﬁrst instance (the Chancery Division) (in VTB
Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp [2011] EWHC 3107 (Ch)) did not pierce the
corporate veil, and the Court of Appeal (in VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp
[2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 313; [2012] 2 BCLC 437; [2012] 2 CLC 431) again refused to pierce the
corporate veil.
47 VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp supra note 44 para 130.
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20(9) of the Companies Act is indeed a manifestation of such provi-
sion.48 While the court in Gore stated that it was not necessary to
determine the question, it did nevertheless comment that it was not clear
that the United Kingdom Supreme Court would have come to the same
conclusion had a statutory provision akin to section 20(9) of the
Companies Act been applicable in English law.49 It seems quite possible
that if South African courts were to determine the same question that
was before the court in VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp,50
in the light of and in reliance on section 20(9) of the Companies Act,
they might well come to a different conclusion on whether the corporate
veil could be pierced in this instance. As the court in Gore conﬁrmed and
stated above, the ambit of section 20(9) appears indeed to have
broadened the bases upon which South African courts have hitherto
under the common law been prepared to grant relief that entails
disregarding corporate personality.51
(f) Not a remedy of last resort
As discussed further in paragraph IV below, there is uncertainty and
much confusion in regard to the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil
under the common law. One manifestation of this uncertainty emanates
from the question whether piercing the corporate veil is a remedy of last
resort under the common law.
In Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd52 the
Appellate Division remarked that if the facts of a particular case justify
piercing of the corporate veil, the existence of another remedy should
not in principle serve as a bar to a court piercing the corporate veil.53 The
Appellate Division stated further that the existence of another remedy,
or the failure to pursue one that was available, would be a relevant factor
when policy considerations come into play, but it is not of overriding
importance.54
Subsequent decisions at common law did not favour this view. In
Hülse-Reutter v Gödde,55 the SupremeCourt of Appeal adopted a stricter
approach in this respect and stated:
48 Supra note 1 para 24.
49 Ibid.
50 Supra note 44.
51 Supra note 1 para 33.
52 Supra note 6.
53 Idem at 805.
54 Ibid.
55 2001 (4) SA 1336 (SCA).
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‘The very exceptional nature of the relief which the respondent
seeks against the appellants requires, in the circumstances of the
present case, that he should have no other remedy.’56
In Gore the court stated, obiter, that this assertion of the Supreme Court
of Appeal in Hülse-Reutter v Gödde57 has been misunderstood to imply
that the corporate veil should not be pierced if the claimant has an
alternative remedy, but in fact it goes no further than to state that,
depending on the facts of a given case, the existence of an alternative
remedy may be a relevant consideration.58
In Amlin (SA) Pty Ltd v Van Kooij,59 however, the Cape Provincial
Division was emphatic in stating that piercing the corporate veil must be
used as a remedy of last resort. Dlodlo J stated:
‘I accept that ‘‘opening the curtains’’ or piercing the veil is rather
a drastic remedy. For that reason alone it must be resorted to
rather sparingly and indeed as the very last resort in circumstances
where justice will not otherwise be done between two litigants. It
cannot, for example, be resorted to as an alternative remedy if
another remedy on the same facts can successfully be employed in
order to administer justice between the parties.’60
In Gore the Western Cape High Court clearly acknowledged that under
the common law a judicial philosophy exists that the separate legal
personality of a company should be disregarded only in exceptional
circumstances and as a last resort.61
In the English case of Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited,62 the Supreme
Court also remarked that the power to pierce the corporate veil is to be
exercised when ‘all other, more conventional, remedies have proved to
be of no assistance’.63 The Supreme Court in this case adopted a
conservative approach towards the doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil and commented pertinently that ‘if it is not necessary to pierce the
corporate veil, it is not appropriate to do so, because on that footing
there is no public policy imperative which justiﬁes that course’.64
56 Idem para 23.
57 Supra note 55.
58 Supra note 1 para 34n38.
59 2008 (2) SA 558 (C).
60 Idem para 23.
61 Supra note 1 para 27. See further Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim supra note 41
para 9 and Al-Kharafi & Sons v Pema and Others NNO 2010 (2) SA 360 (W) paras 36–7.
62 Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited [2013] 2 AC 415.
63 Idem para 62.
64 Idem para 35.
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The question thus arises whether the same common-law principle is
to be applied to section 20(9) of the Companies Act: that is, whether
section 20(9) is to be applied only when all other, more conventional
remedies, are of no assistance.
Gore is authority for the view that the answer to this question is in
the negative. The court remarked that the unqualiﬁed availability of the
remedy under section 20(9) militates against an approach that
the remedy should be granted only in the absence of any alternative
remedy.65 It is submitted that the court’s interpretation of section 20(9)
is in this respect correct. Binns-Ward J held:
‘The newly introduced statutory provision affords a ﬁrm, albeit very
ﬂexibly deﬁned, basis for the remedy, which will inevitably operate,
I think, to erode the foundation of the philosophy that piercing the
corporate veil should be approached with an à priori difﬁdence. By
expressly establishing its availability simply when the facts of a case
justify it, the provision detracts from the notion that the remedy
should be regarded as exceptional, or ‘‘drastic’’.’66
It is submitted that this represents a new direction and a sharp shift in
thinking in regard to the remedy of piercing the corporate veil. It has the
implication that in the event of a court having the option of applying a
remedy to the facts before it that would result in the separate legal
personality of a company being upheld, the court may nevertheless
choose to pierce the corporate veil and disregard a company’s separate
legal personality under section 20(9) of the Companies Act. This also
brings the position under section 20(9) of the Companies Act more into
line with the dicta expressed by the AppellateDivision inCape Pacific Ltd
v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd,67 that piercing the corporate
veil is not a remedy of last resort.
III ACHIEVING A BALANCE IN APPLYING SECTION 20(9)
OF THE COMPANIES ACT
On the question of whether section 20(9) has replaced the common law
on piercing the corporate veil, in Gore it was held that there is no express
intention to this effect (as is seen for instance in section 165(1)68 of the
Companies Act) but, equally, no express indication that the intention is
65 Supra note 1 para 34. See further Cassim et al op cit note 11 at 58.
66 Ibid.
67 Supra note 6.
68 Section 165(1) of the Companies Act concerns derivative actions. The provision
expressly states that any right at common law of a person other than a company to bring or
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not to displace the common law (as is seen in section 161(2)(b)69 of the
Companies Act).70 In the light of the fact that there are no set categories
of instances in which a court will pierce the corporate veil at common
law71 and the ‘elusiveness of a convincing deﬁnition of the pertinent
common-law principles’,72 the court came to the conclusion that it
would be appropriate to regard section 20(9) of the Companies Act as
supplemental to the common law, rather than substitutive.73 Thus
where the requirements of section 20(9) are not fulﬁlled and the section
may not be relied upon, the common-law remedy of piercing the veil
would still be applicable. The principles developed at common law with
regard to piercing the corporate veil would no doubt serve as useful
guidelines for interpreting section 20(9) of the Companies Act.
It is submitted that one particular important common-law prin-
ciple which must serve as a guideline to the court in applying section
20(9) of the Companies Act is that which arises from the leading case of
Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd, where
Smalberger JA held:74
‘It is undoubtedly a salutary principle that our Courts should not
lightly disregard a company’s separate personality, but should strive
to give effect to and uphold it. To do otherwise would negate or
undermine the policy and principles that underpin the concept of
separate corporate personality and the legal consequences that
attach to it. But where fraud, dishonesty or other improper conduct
(and I conﬁne myself to such situations) is found to be present,
other considerations will come into play. The need to preserve the
separate corporate identity would in such circumstances have to be
prosecute any legal proceedings on behalf of that company is abolished, and the rights in s 165
of the Companies Act are in substitution for any such abolished right.
69 Section 161(2)(b) concerns remedies which are available to protect the rights of the
securities holders. The provision states that the right to apply to a court in terms of s 161 is in
addition to any other remedy available to a securities holder in terms of the Companies Act or
in terms of the common law, subject to the Companies Act. For a further example, see s 20(8)
of the Companies Act, which states that s 20(7), concerning the Turquand Rule, is to be
construed concurrently with, and not in substitution for, any relevant common-law principle
relating to the presumed validity of the actions of a company in the exercise of its powers.
70 Supra note 1 para 31.
71 See Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd supra note 6 where the
Appellate Division implied that we do not have a categorising approach to piercing the veil in
South African law.
72 Gore supra note 1 para 34.
73 Ibid.
74 Supra note 6.
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balanced against policy considerations which arise in favour of
piercing the corporate veil. . ..’75
This balancing approach laid down by the Appellate Division in Cape
Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd is modelled on the
United States case of Glazer v Commission on Ethics for Public Employ-
ees,76 where the Supreme Court of Louisiana stated that the policies
behind the recognition of a separate corporate existence must be
balanced against the policies justifying piercing.77 The balancing
approach emphasises the importance of a company’s separate legal
personality and requires a court to balance the need to preserve a
company’s separate legal personality against policy considerations
which arise in favour of piercing the corporate veil. In Gore, Binns-Ward
J also endorsed the balancing approach in the context of piercing the
corporate veil:
‘In my view the determination to disregard the distinctness pro-
vided in terms of a company’s separate legal personality appears in
each case to reﬂect a policy-based decision resultant upon a
weighing by the court of the importance of giving effect to the legal
concept of juristic personality, acknowledging thematerial practical
and legal considerations that underpin the legal ﬁction, on the one
hand, as against the adverse moral and economic effects of counte-
nancing an unconscionable abuse of the concept by the founders,
shareholders, or controllers of a company, on the other.’78
Simply put, the court stated that in determining whether to pierce the
corporate veil, one must weigh up or balance the importance of giving
effect to the separate legal personality of a company against the adverse
moral and economic effects of tolerating an unconscionable abuse of the
juristic personality of the company.
It is clear from the wide interpretation given by the court in Gore to
section 20(9) of the Companies Act, as discussed above, that the power
of courts to pierce the corporate veil of companies has now increased
considerably. Not only is the level of abuse required in order for section
20(9) to be applicable far lower than that required under section 65 of
the Close Corporations Act, but, as reasoned in Gore, section 20(9) is to
75 Idem at 803. See also Die Dros (Pty) Ltd and Another v Telefon Beverages CC and Others
2003 (4) SA 207 (C) para 23; Al-Kharafi & Sons v Pema supra note 61 para 37; and Rees and
Others v Harris and Others 2012 (1) SA 583 (GSJ) para 15.
76 So 2d 752 (La 1983).
77 Idem at 757.
78 Supra note 1 para 29.
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be regarded neither as an exceptional remedy nor as a remedy of last
resort. A concern arises whether South African courts would, in the light
of their new powers under section 20(9) of the Companies Act, disregard
the corporate veil too lightly. Will we see in South African law a
development of a disproportionate application of the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil?
As the court in Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty)
Ltd79 emphasised, if the separate legal personality of a company is too
lightly disregarded by courts, this would negate and undermine the
policy and principles that underpin the concept of separate corporate
personality and the legal consequences that attach thereto.80 The
separate legal personality of a company is soundly afﬁrmed in section
19(1)(b) of the Companies Act, which states that, from the date and time
that the incorporation of a company is registered, the company has all
the legal powers and capacity of an individual.81 It would be regrettable if
courts were to make undue incursions into this fundamental statutory
provision, or the overarching principles laid down in Salomon v A
Salomon and Co Ltd82 (‘Salomon v Salomon’) that a company is a
separate legal person independent and distinct from its shareholders and
directors.83 Lord Templeman referred to the principle in Salomon v
Salomon as the ‘unyielding rock’84 on which company law is con-
structed, and on which ‘complicated arguments’ may in the end become
‘shipwrecked’.85 Notably, in the seminal case of Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp
Municipal Council86 Innes CJ held that
‘[t]his conception of the existence of a company as a separate entity
distinct from its shareholders is no merely artiﬁcial and technical
thing. It is a matter of substance’.87
79 Supra note 6.
80 Idem at 803. See further Die Dros (Pty) Ltd v Telefon Beverages CC supra note 75 para 23;
Ebrahim and Another v Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 585 (SCA) para 22;
Al-Kharafi & Sons v Pema supra note 61 para 37; and Rees v Harris supra note 75 para 15.
81 This applies except to the extent that a juristic person is incapable of exercising any such
power or having any such capacity, or except to the extent that the company’s Memorandum
of Incorporation provides otherwise (s 19(1)(b)(i) and (ii)).
82 [1897] AC 22 (HL).
83 As LordHalsbury LC in Salomon v Salomon stated, a legally incorporated company ‘must
be treated like any other independent person with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself
. . . whatever may have been the ideas or schemes of those who brought it into existence’
(supra note 82 at 30–1).
84 Lord Templeman ‘Company law lecture – Forty years on’ (1990) 11 The Company
Lawyer 10 at 10.
85 Ibid.
86 1920 AD 530.
87 Idem at 550.
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In Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited,88 the United Kingdom Supreme
Court recently remarked that the separate personality of a company is
sometimes described as a ﬁction, and in a sense it is, but this ﬁction is the
whole foundation of company law.89
In order to ensure that courts do not pierce the corporate veil too
lightly, it is submitted that, in exercising their discretion whether to
apply section 20(9), courts must carefully apply the balancing approach
stated in Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd90
and Gore91 before piercing the corporate veil and deeming a company
not to be a juristic person. Courts must apply their discretion cautiously
and wisely and with due consideration to both sides of the balancing
equation before piercing the corporate veil under section 20(9) of the
Companies Act.
A trend is discernible from recent judgments of the United Kingdom,
which is that the courts are exercising much caution and restraint in
piercing the corporate veil.92 South African courts have, however,
generally tended to adopt a discernibly more liberal approach to
piercing the corporate veil than the English courts.93 As the Supreme
Court of Appeal in Ebrahim v Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd94 observed,
in commenting on the application of section 64(1) (personal liability in
88 Supra note 62. See also The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation and
Another 1994 (1) SA 550 (A) 565–6.
89 Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited supra note para 8.
90 Supra note 6 at 803.
91 Supra note 1 para 29.
92 See, for example, the judgments in Faiza Ben Hashem v Ali Shayif supra note 8 which
crystallised various grounds upon which the corporate veil will be pierced, a case regarded as a
leading authority on piercing the corporate veil in the UK; the respective judgments of the
Chancery Division, Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in VTB Capital plc v Nutritek
International Corp supra note 46; VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp supra note 46
and VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp supra note 44; and Prest v Petrodel Resources
Limited supra note 62. The issue before the Supreme Court in Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited
waswhether a number of properties belonging to the Petrodel Groupwhichwere wholly owned
by Michael Prest (the husband) could be transferred to his wife in the context of divorce
proceedings between them, given that the properties legally belonged not to the husband but to
his companies. The court found that, for reasons of wealth protection and avoidance of tax, the
legal interest in the properties had been vested in the companies a long time before themarriage
had dissolved. Accordingly, the court found that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil was
not applicable because the husband’s actions did not conceal or evade any legal obligation to his
wife, nor was he concealing or evading the law in relation to the distribution of assets of the
marriage upon its dissolution.However, theUK SupremeCourt did ﬁnd in favour of thewife in
this matter on another ground: that is, that in the particular circumstances of the case, the
properties vested in the companies were held by the husband’s companies on trust for him and
they were accordingly properties to which the husband was entitled, either in possession or
reversion.
93 See Gore supra note 1 para 27.
94 Supra note 80.
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regard to conducting business recklessly or for fraudulent purposes) and
section 65 of the Close Corporations Act, ‘[i]n contrast with the United
Kingdom, where it seems the equivalent provisions have in recent years
‘‘been very rarely used’’ to fasten directors with personal liability, the
jurisprudence of this court evidences claimants’ spirited reliance on
the provision’.95 It is submitted that this spirited reliance by applicants
on piercing the corporate veil may well increase in the light of section
20(9) of the Companies Act, but that courts must give due consideration
to balancing the need to preserve a company’s separate legal personality
against policy considerations which arise in favour of piercing the
corporate veil, and refrain from piercing the corporate veil too lightly.
It is instructive that in Brazil, which has various statutory provisions
authorising the court to pierce the corporate veil, it is now widely agreed
that there has been a disproportionate and inappropriate application of
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Piercing the corporate veil in
Brazil is statutorily provided for in Article 50 of the Brazilian Civil Code
(LawNumber 10406 of 2002), which states that if there is a deviation of a
company’s purpose96 or the commingling of assets97 caused by the abuse
of its legal entity status by one of its members or managers, the court
may consider such partner or manager personally liable without limita-
tion (including personal property) for the company’s obligations and
debts. Piercing of the corporate veil is also statutorily provided for in the
Brazilian Competition Law,98 Consumer Protection Code,99 and Envi-
95 Idem para 22.
96 Deviation of the company’s purpose in this context occurs when the truth is distorted to
use a company for purposes other than those for which it was established, causing harm to a
third party for the beneﬁt of oneself or another (see Luciana Bassani & Rinúccia Faria La
Ruina ‘Piercing the corporate veil’ Danneman Siemsen News March/May 2011, available at
http://www.dannemann.com.br/site.cfm?app=show&dsp=dsnews_201103_4&pos=5.98&lng=
en, accessed on 16 August 2013).
97 Commingling of assets occurs when funds of the company are misused, for example
where corporate funds are used to pay personal debts (see Alan R Palmiter Corporations 7 ed
(2012) 32–3).
98 Article 34 of the Brazilian Competition Law (Law Number 12529/2012, effective from 30
May 2012) states: ‘The corporate entity may be disregarded in case of violation of the
economic order, upon the occurrence of abuse of rights, abuse of powers, violation of law,
tort, or violation of the bylaws or the articles of association’, and further that ‘[t]he piercing of
the corporate veil also may be ordered upon the occurrence of bankruptcy, insolvency,
closure, or inactivity of the corporate entity resulting from mismanagement’.
99 Article 28 of the Brazilian Consumer Protection Code (Law Number 8078/90 of 11
September 1990) states:
‘The court may order the piercing of the corporate veil when, to the
detriment of the end consumer, there is abuse of rights, abuse of powers,
violation of the law, tort, or violation of the bylaws or the articles of
association. The piercing of the corporate veil may also be ordered upon the
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ronmental Law.100 However, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil
in Brazil is thought to be treated by the Brazilian courts in a ‘broad,
superﬁcial and sparse manner’.101 It seems that an increasing number of
courts in Brazil are piercing the corporate veil,
‘without discernment and observation of the legal requirements. . . .
The exception has become the rule, defying the limited liability
principle and corporate autonomy, which for centuries have
enabled and fostered business activity’.102
The excessive piercing of the corporate veil by Brazilian courts has
entailed the invalidation of the company’s corporate entity and the
limitation of liability, principles which are both duly recognised by
the Brazilian legal system.103
Brazil recently introduced into law a new Bill (Bill Number 3401/2008
of 24 April 2008) (‘Bill 3401/2008’) to regulate the procedure under
which a court may pierce the corporate veil. The rationale behind the
introduction of Bill 3401/2008, as stated in the Bill itself, is that it is
widely agreed that there has been a disproportionate and inappropriate
application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.104 Bill 3401/
2008 aims to prevent a misuse of the doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil and to safeguard certain principles recognised by the federal
Constitution of Brazil. It also aims to establish a speciﬁc judicial
procedure for piercing the corporate veil, in compliance with the
constitutional rights of the due process of law, full defence, and use of
the adversary system.105 For instance, Article 3 of Bill 3401/2008
provides that prior to deciding on whether to order the liability of
members, founders, partners, or managers for obligations undertaken
by the corporate entity, a court must establish the adversarial process,
allowing such members, founders, partners, or managers to exercise
their right of full defence.
occurrence of bankruptcy, insolvency, closure, or inactivity of the corporate
entity resulting from mismanagement.’
Section 5 of Article 28 states: ‘The corporate entity also may be disregarded whenever the
separation of its assets constitutes, by any means whatsoever, an obstacle to indemniﬁcation
for damage caused to end consumers.’
100 Article 4 of the Brazilian Environmental Law (Law Number 9605/98 of 12 February
1998) provides that ‘[t]he corporate entity may be disregarded whenever the separation of its
assets constitutes an obstacle to indemniﬁcation for damage caused to the environment’.
101 Felipe Toscano ‘Piercing the corporate veil under Brazilian law’ (2012) 34 The
Comparative Law Yearbook of International Business 323 at 339.
102 Bassani & La Ruina op cit note 96.
103 Toscano op cit note 101 at 329.
104 See the justiﬁcation for Bill 3401/2008 set out in the Bill.
105 See Toscano op cit note 101 at 339.
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It would be regrettable if a similar situation which has arisen in Brazil
were to arise in South African law in regard to piercing the corporate veil
of companies. It is submitted that, in exercising its discretion and powers
to pierce the corporate veil under section 20(9) of the Companies Act,
South African courtsmust take pains to ensure that such a situation does
not arise and that courts do not develop a disproportionate or inappro-
priate application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.
IV CLARITY AND SIMPLICITY
There exists in South African common law an uncertainty and a high
level of confusion in regard to the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.
In Gore the court stated that there are no clearly determinable principles
in regard to the grounds onwhich courts will pierce the corporate veil.106
The court agreed with the statements by Smalberger JA in Cape Pacific
Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd107 that ‘[t]he law is far
from settled with regard to the circumstances in which it would be
permissible to pierce the corporate veil’.108
This uncertainty and confusion in regard to the doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil is shared by courts in the United Kingdom. For
example, Lord Neuberger of the Supreme Court held in VTB Capital plc
v Nutritek International Corp109 in regard to the doctrine of piercing the
veil, that ‘the precise nature, basis, and meaning of the principle are all
somewhat obscure, as are the precise nature of circumstances in which
the principle can apply’.110 In Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited,111
commenting on the question of the circumstances when the corporate
veil would be pierced, the Supreme Court asserted that ‘the question is
heavily burdened by authority, much of it characterised by incautious
dicta and inadequate reasoning’.112 After surveying the authorities on
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, the Supreme Court came
to the conclusion that the law relating to the doctrine is unsatisfactory
and confused, and found that it was impossible to discern ‘any coherent
106 Supra note 1 para 21.
107 Supra note 6.
108 Idem at 802. See further Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim supra note 41 para 9
and Rees v Harris supra note 75 para 14.
109 Supra note 44.
110 Idem para 123.
111 Supra note 62.
112 Idem para 19.
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approach, applicable principles, or deﬁned limitations to the doc-
trine’.113
In theUnited States of America, piercing the corporate veil is themost
litigated issue in corporate law, and it occurs more frequently in that
country than anywhere else in the world.114 Yet the doctrine has been
criticised strongly by the courts. For instance, in Allied Capital Corp v
GC-Sun Holdings LP,115 the Delaware Court of Chancery remarked that
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has been ‘rightfully criticized
for its ambiguity and randomness’116 and that its application ‘yield[s]
few predictable results’.117 Legal writers in the United States have also
described judicial decisions to pierce the corporate veil as confusing. For
instance, Easterbrook and Fischel have bitingly commented as follows:
‘‘‘Piercing’’ seems to happen freakishly. Like lightning, it is rare,
severe, and unprincipled. There is a consensus that thewhole area of
limited liability, and conversely of piercing the corporate veil, is
among the most confusing in corporate law.’118
The lack of a coherent principle in the application of the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil has been commented on in Australian law as
well.119 For example, in Briggs v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd,120 Rogers
AJA in the New South Wales Court of Appeal commented as follows:
‘[T]here is no common, unifying principle, which underlies the
occasional decision of the courts to pierce the corporate veil.
Although an ad hoc explanation may be offered by a court which so
113 Idem para 64.
114 Empirical evidence in the USA has documented veil piercing as the most litigated issue
in company law. See Robert B Thompson ‘Piercing the corporate veil: An empirical study’
(1991) 76 Cornell LR 1036 at 1036; Robert B Thompson ‘Piercing the veil: Is the common law
the problem’ (2005) 37 Connecticut LR 619 at 619; and Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited supra
note 62 paras 76–7. Yet theUS courts do not generally pierce the corporate veil so as to remove
limited liability in the case of a public company, nor do they do so as a matter of routine in
private companies (see Paul L Davies & Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of
Modern Company Law 9 ed (2012) 223).
115 A 2d 1020 (Del Ch, 2006).
116 Idem at 1042.
117 Idem at 1043. See further Franklin A Gevurtz Corporation Law 2 ed (2000) 69–72 for a
discussion of some of the reasons for the confusion in the doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil in the USA.
118 Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel ‘Limited liability and the corporation’ (1985)
52 University of Chicago LR 89 at 89. See further the authorities cited in Allied Capital
Corporation v GC-Sun Holdings LP supra note 115 at 1042–3.
119 See Ian M Ramsay & David B Noakes ‘Piercing the corporate veil in Australia’ (2001) 19
Company and Securities LJ 250.
120 (1989) 16 NSWLR 549.
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decides, there is no principled approach to be derived from the
authorities.’121
In a similar vein, theNewZealandCourt of Appeal inAttorney-General v
Equiticorp Industries Group Ltd (In Statutory Management)122 remarked
that
‘‘‘to lift the corporate veil’’ . . . is not a principle. It describes the
process, but provides no guidance as to when it can be used’.123
It is clear that, in South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States
and other leading jurisdictions, the doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil is regarded as confusing and uncertain.124 It is submitted that, in
the light of the confusion and uncertainty in the common law on the
application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, courts must
strive to clarify the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil in South
African law. As the United Kingdom Supreme Court held in Prest v
Petrodel Resources Limited,125 it is important to maintain clarity and
simplicity in piercing the corporate veil, and if the doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil is to exist, ‘the circumstances in which it can apply
must be limited and as clear as possible’.126 It is submitted that in
interpreting and applying section 20(9) of the Companies Act, courts
must endeavour to develop the statutory doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil in a way that will maintain clarity and simplicity, so as to
demystify the confusion which exists in the common law. Two ways in
which the courts may do so are discussed below.
(a) Avoiding the use of metaphors
Oneway inwhich to demystify the confusion and uncertainty surround-
ing the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil would be for courts to
avoid the use of metaphors and derogatory descriptive terms in their
judgments. As discussed, Gore asserted that the words ‘unconscionable
abuse of the juristic personality of a company’ used in section 20(9) of
121 Idem at 567. See also Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2004] NSWSC 695
para 144.
122 [1996] 1 NZLR 528.
123 Idem at 541.
124 It has been suggested that a reason for the confusion and uncertainty is that cases on
piercing the corporate veil tend to be inherently fact-speciﬁc and subject to individual
interpretation, which often results in the absence of clarity. See Jason Harris & Anil Hargovan
‘Corporate groups: The intersection between corporate and tax law: Commissioner of
Taxation v BHP Billiton Finance Ltd’ (2010) 32 Sydney LR 723 at 726.
125 Supra note 62.
126 Idem para 67.
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the Companies Act postulate conduct in relation to the formation and
use of companies which is diverse enough to cover all the descriptive
terms such as sham, device, stratagem, and conceivably much more.127
In VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp,128 Lord Neuberger
of the United Kingdom Supreme Court questioned the usefulness of
applying words such as façade, sham,mask, cloak, and device, and stated
that while such words may be useful metaphors
‘such pejorative expressions are often dangerous, as they risk
assisting moral indignation to triumph over legal principle, and,
while theymay enable a court to arrive at a result which seems fair in
the case in question, they can also risk causing confusion and
uncertainty in the law’.129
In Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd130 too, the United Kingdom Supreme
Court remarked that the use of pejorative expressions masks the absence
of rational analysis and should be avoided.131
These views expressed by the United Kingdom Supreme Court
resonate with the well-known and oft-quoted remark of Justice Cardozo
as early as 1926 in the United States case of Berkey v Third Ave. Ry. Co.132
that veil piercing is ‘enveloped in the mists of metaphor’.133 Justice
Cardozo cautioned that ‘metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched,
for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving
it’.134 The reason for this could be that these metaphors tend to describe
the results without explaining the reasons for the decisions.135 In a
similar vein, in the United States case of Glazer v Commission on Ethics
for Public Employees,136 the court proclaimed that the courts often pierce
the corporate veil by saying simply that the corporation is the ‘instru-
mentality’ or ‘alter ego’ of the individual shareholder, ‘without
adequately explaining the real basis upon which this metaphorical
language rests’.137 The use of metaphorical language has also been
decried on the basis that it would make the approach to piercing the veil
difﬁcult to apply as it avoids formulating a substantive principle and is
127 Supra note 1 para 34.
128 Supra note 44.
129 Idem para 124.
130 Supra note 62.
131 Idem para 78.
132 NY 84 (1926).
133 At 94.
134 Ibid.
135 Thompson op cit note 114 at 624.
136 Supra note 76.
137 Idem at 757.
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not particularly helpful in trying to identify broader principles for
determining when the separate legal personality of a company may be
ignored.138
It is submitted that, perhaps by South African courts taking heed of
these criticisms of the use of metaphors and descriptive terms such as
‘sham’, ‘device’, ‘stratagem’, ‘mask’, ‘cloak’, ‘alter ego’ and so forth, and
avoiding the use of such metaphors and pejorative expressions, this
would contribute towards the eradication of some of the confusion and
uncertainty surrounding the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil in
South African law. It would also contribute towards the proper develop-
ment and interpretation of section 20(9) of the Companies Act in a
manner that is clear and unambiguous, and with reasons for the
conclusions reached being clearly and rationally explained.
(b) Avoiding morality triumphing over legal principle
Gore’s case also referred to the balancing of the need to give effect to the
concept of separate legal personality, on the one hand, as against the
adverse ‘moral’139 and economic effects of countenancing an unconscio-
nable abuse of the concept by the controllers of the company, on the
other. The court thus regarded the adverse moral effects of the uncon-
scionable abuse as a factor to be taken into consideration in the
balancing approach. One could perhaps argue that the word ‘unconscio-
nable’ implies some form ofmoral consideration, but the question arises
whether morality should indeed be taken into consideration in the
balancing approach.
The question before the court in Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corp v
Stepanovs140 was the very same question that was before the court inVTB
Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp:141 that is, whether the corpo-
rate veil could be pierced to hold non-contracting parties contractually
bound under an agreement entered into by a separate entity that was
controlled by them. The High Court in Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corp v
Stepanovs found that the corporate veil could be pierced to allow
contractual claims to be brought against non-contracting parties, and
concluded that in situations where the contracting party was merely a
‘puppet’ company, a victim may bring a contractual claim against both
the ‘puppet’ company and the non-contracting ‘puppeteer’, who ‘all the
138 See Thompson op cit note 114 at 624; David Kershaw Company Law in Context: Text
and Materials 2 ed (2012) 57 and Gevurtz op cit note 117 at 70.
139 Supra note 1 para 29.
140 Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corp v Stepanovs [2012] BCC 182.
141 Supra note 44.
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time, was pulling the strings’.142 However the Supreme Court in VTB
Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp overruled Antonio Gramsci
Shipping Corp v Stepanovs and held instead that there was an over-
whelming case against extending the principle of piercing the corporate
veil in this way.143 Lord Neuberger proclaimed that a strong justiﬁca-
tion is required before a court would be prepared to extend the principle
of piercing the corporate veil in this manner,144 and ruled that the
conclusion of Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corp v Stepanovs was
‘driven by an understandable desire to ensure that an individual
who appears to have been the moving spirit behind a dishonourable
(or worse) transaction, action, or receipt, should not be able to
avoid liability by relying on the fact that the transaction, action, or
receipt was effected through the medium . . . of a company’.145
The Supreme Court found this to be an insufﬁcient reason for justifying
piercing the corporate veil in order to render that individual a party to
the contract.146 The rejection of morality as a factor in piercing the
corporate veil is reinforced by theUnited KingdomSupremeCourt in its
rejection of the use of metaphors and pejorative expressions in the
context of piercing the veil, as previously discussed, on the ground that
such expressions enable moral indignation to triumph over legal
principle.
It is submitted that, having regard to the rejection of morality as a
factor in determining whether to pierce the corporate veil by the United
Kingdom Supreme Court and, particularly in the light of section 5(2) of
the Companies Act in South Africa, which provides that, to the extent
appropriate, courts may consider foreign law in interpreting or applying
the Companies Act, in the event of courts considering the moral effects
of countenancing an unconscionable abuse of the legal personality of the
company in the balancing approach, as held by Gore, they must exercise
caution to ensure that moral indignation does not in fact triumph over
legal principle. If moral indignation were to do so, this would cloud
the legal principles in issue and would cause confusion and uncertainty
142 Supra note 140 para 26.
143 Supra note 44 paras 137 and 147. The Supreme Court held that this proposed extension
to the principle of piercing the corporate veil was all the more difﬁcult to justify, given that the
appellant could seek damages on the basis of negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation (para
139).
144 Supra note 44 para 137.
145 Idem para 147.
146 Ibid.
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in the legal principles applicable to piercing the corporate veil under
section 20(9) of the Companies Act.
V CONCLUSION
Section 20(9) of the Companies Act has conferred extensive powers on
the South African courts to pierce the corporate veil, powers that do not
exist under common law. The provision represents a new direction and
shift in thinking in regard to the remedy of piercing the corporate veil.
Some elements of section 20(9) of the Companies Act which illustrate
the width of the provision and the wide powers given to courts are as
follows:
(i) Section 20(9) may be invoked by a court of its own initiative,
regardless of whether the litigant in the matter before the court has
requested the court to do so.
(ii) Courts have been given the very widest of powers to grant
consequential relief under section 20(9) of the Companies Act.
(iii) The words ‘interested person’ have been given a wide meaning by
Gore, which is arguably wider than the meaning given to the
similarly worded section 65 of the Close Corporations Act, where a
ﬁnancial or monetary interest is an essential prerequisite. It is
questionable whether this was the intention of Gore and whether it
correctly reﬂects the legal position.
(iv) The words ‘unconscionable abuse’ in section 20(9) have been given
a very wide meaning by Gore. A much lower level of abuse is
required under section 20(9) of the Companies Act as compared to
that under section 65 of the Close Corporations Act before the
corporate veil may be pierced. It may be that too low a level or
threshold of abuse has been set by Gore.
(v) An application under section 20(9) may be brought whenever the
illegitimate use of the company’s separate legal personality affects
one in a way that should not reasonably be countenanced.
(vi) The wide meaning given to the term ‘unconscionable abuse’,
together with the liberal approach adopted by Gore in regard to the
application of section 20(9), make it clear that the legal bases upon
which courts have been prepared to pierce the corporate veil under
the common law have been considerably extended under section
20(9) of the Companies Act.
(vii) Section 20(9) is not a remedy of last resort and is not to be regarded
as an exceptional remedy, as is arguably the case under the
common law.
The common-law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has not been
repealed by section 20(9) of the Companies Act. It is submitted that the
PIERCING THE VEIL UNDER SECTION 20(9) OF THE COMPANIES ACT 335
common-law principles of piercing the corporate veil continue to serve
as useful guidelines in interpreting section 20(9) of the Companies Act.
It is submitted further that the balancing approach, stated inCape Pacific
Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd147 and endorsed by
Gore,148 which requires a court to balance the need to preserve a
company’s separate legal personality against policy considerations
which arise in favour of piercing the corporate veil, must be carefully
applied by the courts in exercising their discretion whether to pierce the
corporate veil under section 20(9) of the Companies Act. This approach
may ensure that, in the light of the wide powers given to the courts to
pierce the corporate veil under section 20(9) of the Companies Act,
courts do not disregard the corporate veil too lightly, or risk making
unfounded inroads into the overarching principles of separate legal
personality laid down in section 19(1) of the Companies Act, Salomon v
Salomon149 and Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council.150 It is
essential that courts exercise their discretion to pierce the corporate veil
wisely and that they exercise caution to ensure that they do not develop
in the South African law a disproportionate and inappropriate applica-
tion of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, as has occurred in
Brazil, which also has a statutory remedy of piercing the corporate veil.
It is submitted further that in the light of the uncertainty and
confusion which exists in regard to the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil in the South African common law as well as that of several
leading foreign jurisdictions, courts must strive to interpret and apply
section 20(9) of the Companies Act in a way that will maintain clarity
and simplicity, so as to demystify the confusion surrounding the
doctrine at common law. It is submitted that one way of doing this
would be for courts to refrain from using metaphors and pejorative
expressions in their judgments as such expressions may obstruct sub-
stantive principles being formulated, and may thereby cause confusion
and uncertainty. It is submitted in addition that in applying section
20(9) of the Companies Act, courts must exercise caution to ensure that
moral indignation does not triumph over legal principle, as this could
cloud the legal principles in issue and cause more confusion and
uncertainty.
Even though some of the questions and uncertainties regarding the
interpretation of section 20(9) of the Companies Act have been
147 Supra note 6 at 803.
148 Supra note 1 para 29.
149 Supra note 82.
150 Supra note 86.
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addressed in Gore, what remains unclear is the effect of the liberal
powers given to courts by section 20(9) of the Companies Act and by
Gore to pierce the corporate veil of companies. This remains to be seen.
———————–
PIERCING THE VEIL UNDER SECTION 20(9) OF THE COMPANIES ACT 337
